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I. INTRODUCTION

Judges are a vital component of a democracy. How judges are selected
can impact the quality of justice and the level of public confidence in the
courts.
A variety of methods are used to select state judges, ranging from
partisan elections to merit selection and retention. Each state has its own
unique system. Some states elect judges as a way to ensure accountability;
others chose some type of merit selection process to ensure the greatest
degree of independence; still others use a combination of the two methods.
The two principal models are merit selection and retention and elections,
both partisan and non-partisan. Florida currently has a hybrid system using
a combination of the two methods. Circuit judges and judges of the county
courts are elected, while the justices of the supreme court and judges of the
district courts of appeal are subject to merit selection and retention.2
At the general election in November of 1998, Florida voters adopted an
amendment to the Florida Constitution to allow counties to "opt-in" to a
merit selection process for the selection of county and circuit court
judges.3 The amendment was proposed by the Florida Constitution
Revision Commission, and it was approved by an overwhelming majority
of the electorate.4 This fall, Florida voters in each circuit and county will
have the opportunity to choose a merit selection and retention form of
judicial selection.5
This Article summarizes the long history of the judicial selection
debate (and its reflection in the concepts of accountability and
independence) and discusses the impact of that debate on the structure of
Florida's judiciary. It also discusses the findings and recommendations of
the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission (CRC or Commission)
and provides personal observations by a member of that Commission on
these critical questions.

2. SeeFLA.CONST. art.V,§§ 10-11.
3. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
4. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, §2. The CRC, consisting of thirty-seven members, is appointed
every twenty years by the governor, the speaker of the house, the president of the senate, the chief
justice of the Supreme Court of Florida, and the attorney general, and has the authority to examine
the constitution of the state and propose amendments to the constitution. See id.
5. In November 2000, through popular vote, individual counties will decide whether to "optin" to a plan to implement a merit selection and retention system for the selection of county and
circuit court judges. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
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11. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
Broadly speaking, all the methods of selecting state judges can be
divided into two categories: appointive-based methods and elective-based
methods. 6 A third category for selecting judges can be found in states that
use a combination of these two techniques.7 Florida's judicial selection
system falls into such a third category. Florida uses nonpartisan elections
to select circuit and county courtjudges, while judges of the district courts
of appeal and Supreme Court justices are selected by merit selection and
retention.
There has been fervent debate as to whether ajudge's accountability to
the public for his or her decisions should be more highly valued than a
judge's degree of independence. This debate is relevant to judicial
selection because the particular method used can reflect the relative values
attached to accountability on the one hand, and independence on the other.
Appointive-based methods are seen as fostering more judicial
independence, while elections are credited with holding a judiciary more
accountable to the electorate.

III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES
Accountability and independence are two words aptly used to describe
the characteristics of any qualified judge, yet the two words are rarely used
when describing the attributes of the samejudge.8 This occurs because the
notions of accountability and independence are in many ways opposing
terms. Thus, the desire for a judiciary that is both independent and
accountable may sound paradoxical, if not quixotic.
What is an accountable judge? The term is capable of various
interpretations. For instance, a judge who is accountable may be one who
diligently follows the law, and is said to be accountable to the rule of law.
In a more overtly political and democratic sense, however, it could imply
that a judge is accountable to the citizenry as a representative of that

6. Within these broad categories, there are four principal variations: Pure Appointive,
Partisan Election, Nonpartisan Election, and Merit Selection. Partisan and Nonpartisan elections
differ only by the use in partisan elections of placing the judicial candidate's political affiliation
on the ballot. For purposes of this article, Partisan and Nonpartisan election plans have been
grouped together into "elective methods." Purely Appointive selection methods and Merit Selection
plans are also grouped together, but into a separate category: "appointive methods." By reducing
the four main forms of judicial selection to two broader categories, it is hoped a more focused
examination of the differences between a judiciary that is elected to the bench and one that is
appointed to the bench can be made.
7. Many states (Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and others) use different
selection techniques for the selection of trial and Appellate Court judges.
8. See Peter D. Webster, SelectionandRetentionofJudges:Is There One "Best" Method?,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1995).
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citizenry. 9
Although there are different meanings for "accountability," an
"accountable judiciary" typically refers to a judiciary that is accountable
to the public in a political sense-those judges are representatives of the
people. 0 Judges, according to this usage, are similar to legislators.
Advocates of an accountable judiciary argue that judges make decisions
that affect not merely everyday legal policies, but everyday social
life-just like legislators. Supporters believe that without such judicial
accountability, danger lurks in that judges could turn into renegade
legislators, thereby thwarting the will of the people.
Judicial independence defines a judge's ability to rule free of fear or
favor in a given case.12 Judicial independence is widely regarded as crucial
to the administration ofjustice in America, where we profess to be fair and
impartial to all, regardless of class, gender, race, national origin, political
belief, or any other characteristics. Proponents of this concept argue that
without such independence, judges would be beholden to transitory
popular whim and its partisans. They also point out that (unlike politicians)
judicial candidates do not seek office based on a promise to deliver." If
judicial candidates are seen first as politicians with a political or
ideological agenda, and only secondarily as neutral judges, the public may
lose respect for the bench. 4 Hence, adherents of an independent judiciary
argue that without strong safeguards to ensure the independence ofjudges,
the legitimacy of the entire legal enterprise may be in danger.'5 Like
everything else, this tension between accountability and independence has
a history. How did we get here?

9. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that at least for the purposes of the Voting Rights Act,
judges are representatives. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991). But see Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that "[clourts are not
representative bodies").
10. Webster, supra note 8, at 10-11.
11. See id.

12. See ABA MODELCODE OFJiuDICIALCONDUCT, Canon 1, cmt. v (1990).
13. It should be noted that the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct forbids ajudge
or judicial candidate from making a statement that may indicate a future disposition to rule in a
particular manner. See ABA MODELCODE OFJUDICIALCoNDUCr, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990); see
also Webster, supra note 8, at 10.
14. See Webster, supra note 8, at 10.
15. Retired Judge Otto Kaus, of the California Supreme Court aptly stated, "'There's no way
ajudge is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if
he or she has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your
bathtub."' Paul Reidinger, The Politics ofJudging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 58.
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IV. THE HISTORY OF VAIous JUDICIAL SELECTION PLANS
Before the American Revolution, the English monarchy selected the
Colonies' judges through direct appointment. The Crown also held a
largely unfettered power of judicial removal.' 6 With American
independence, the drafters of the Constitution injected more independence
into the judicial branch of the federal government and created such
concepts as lifetime tenure for federal judges. The states followed this
example and initially used an appointive process to select all state judges.17
In order to limit the power of the appointing authorities, the consent of
state legislatures was usually required for any judicial appointment."8 In
addition, the discontent with the Crown's power of removing judges led
to limiting the governor's removal powers. Formal impeachment and trial
was required before a judge could be forced off the bench.
Purely appointive methods of selecting the judiciary lasted until the
Jacksonian period of American history. That era's enthusiasm for popular
elections spread to the election of judges for specific terms of office. For
the first time in history, judges' names began appearing on ballots. State
judges increasingly began to resemble judicial representatives of the
voters. Further, by using judicial elections, judges could be removed
without the use of more difficult impeachment processes.' 9
The turn of the century witnessed the rise in popularity of nonpartisan
elections for judges-no doubt a reaction to the politicization of judicial
races in an elective regime. But, as "straight ticket" voting, which allowed
a voter to cast all of his or her votes for a particular political party, became
the norm in many jurisdictions, support for judicial elections waned.
Partisan politics too often resulted in entrenched corruption. In many
cases, lawyers and bar associations could only hope political parties would
slate judicial candidates who possessed some level of legal ability. As
dissatisfaction with partisan elections grew, support for nonpartisan
judicial elections gained momentum. By removing party labels from the
judicial candidates, the hope was less politicking would take place. By
1927, twelve states employed nonpartisan elections.2 0 Nonpartisan
elections, however, could not solve all the problems of an elected
judiciary.
In 1913, the American Judicature Society was formed to help improve
the quality of the judiciary. It proposed a system of selecting judges that
16. See EVAN HAYNES,

THE SELECTION AND TENURE OFJUDGES 51-78 (1944).
17. See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures,and Issues, 49 U.
MiAMv L. REV. 1, 5 (1994).
18. See id.
19. See LAWERENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OFAMERICAN LAW 129-30 (1985).
20. See Larry C. Berkson, JudicialSelection in the United States: A Special Report, in
JUDICIAL POLITICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 58, 58 (Elliot Slotnick ed., 1992).
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utilized a "special commission" made up of members of the public and the
bar. In 1940, Missouri became the first state to experiment with the merit
selection and retention system (also known as the Missouri Plan, the
Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, Nonpartisan Merit Plan, and, simply,
Merit Selection). Interest in merit selection and retention grew over the
latter half of the twentieth century. Sixteen states now use a form of merit
selection and retention to select their judges.2 ' Elective methods of
selecting judges are dominant in twenty-one states, while nine states use
merit selection and retention and at least one other mechanism to choose
judges.22
Judicial elections operate much the same as ordinary elections with the
names of judicial candidates appearing on the ballot. In partisan judicial
elections, a candidate's political affiliation is displayed as well. Judicial
candidates are elected to specific terms of office, and they may be reelected. Eight states use partisan judicial elections, while thirteen states
use nonpartisanjudicial elections. 3 Judicial candidates orchestrate election
campaigns, and raise funds like politicians. However, unlike ordinary
politicians, judicial candidates are prohibited from speaking on issues that
might come before the court.'
Merit selection is basically a three-step process. First, a judicial
nominating commission comprised of lawyers and public members is
formed to recruit, investigate, and screen candidates to fill a judicial
vacancy. The judicial nominating commission investigates a candidate's
legal ability and personal integrity. Friends, enemies, acquaintances, and
co-workers of the candidates are contacted. The nominating commission
then selects the most qualified of the judicial candidates and submits a list
of names to the governor for appointment.
The judge, at some point, depending on the particular term, must run
in a non-contested retention election where voters signal their approval for
the judge by an affirmative vote. If the judge obtains more "yes" votes
than "no" votes, she or he is retained for another term. At the end of each
term the judge must again receive the approval of a majority of the
electorate in a retention election in order to serve an additional term.

21. See PATICIA A. GARCIA, ROADMAPS: JUDICIAL SELECTION 10 (1998).
22. See id. The remaining four states use a form of pure appointment without a "merit based"

nominating process.
23. See id.
24. See supra note 13.
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V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF

JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS

There has been extensive and almost continuous debate since the early
1830s about which method of judicial selection is best for our system of
justice.' Numerous papers, books, and articles have articulated the "pros"
and "cons" of various systems. Inevitably, an analysis of the competing
methods focuses on the negative aspects of each system. Nevertheless, a
short summation of the competing arguments is helpful to understand
judicial selection and the questions soon-to-face Florida voters.
A. JudicialElections
The elective method is credited with instilling a democratic ethos into
the selection of judges. As discussed earlier, supporters of judicial
elections believe that voters are able to hold judges accountable for their
decisions, at a minimum by voting the judges out of office. Critics claim,
however, that this asserted benefit is more theoretical than real, for once
elected to the bench, judges often are uncontested and their names do not
even appear on the ballot. Proponents of judicial election point to
increased voter participation in the process with the result that the
judiciary theoretically is representative and accountable to the voters.26
Proponents also argue that elections encourage judicial candidates to
know the community they serve and argue that informed voters do make
good judicial electors. In the absence of elections, backers claim, the
judiciary would be less sensitive to the needs of the community.
Judicial elections, like all contested elections, cost money.27 In Florida,
some campaigns for circuit court judgeships have cost more than
$500,000.28 Recently, this phenomenon led the American Bar Association
to draft guidelines setting judicial campaign contribution limits.29 Judicial
candidates themselves sometimes finance their own elections.30 More

25. See Haynes, supra note 16, at 80-101.
26. See Note, JudicialSelection in the States: A CriticalStudy with Proposalsfor Reform,
4 HoPsTRA L. REV. 267, 285 (1976).
27. In 1986, three California Supreme Court justices spent over four million dollars in a
failed attempt to retain their seats on the bench. Opposition to the threejustices spent seven million
to unseat them. See Joseph R. Grodin, Judicial Elections: The California Experience, 70
JUDICATURE 365, 368 (1987).
28. See generally John A. Devault, Il, Do We Want Politiciansor Judges?, 70 FA. B.J.,

Feb. 1996, at 8 (citing H. LUMMUS, THiETRIALJUDGE 138 (1937)).
29. See generally ABA Committee on Judicial Campaign Finance Reform (on file with

author).
30. In Californiajudicial retention elections in 1986, candidates and their families supplied
12.4 percent of all campaign funds. See Philip L. Dubois, FinancingTrialCourt Elections: Who
Contributesto CaliforniaJudicialCampaigns?,70 JuDICATURE 8, 12 (1986).
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often, however, attorneys and law firms are the ones that contribute to
judicial elections.31 Judicial elections are criticized for encouraging
campaign contributions from lawyers who then will appear before the
same judges to whom they contribute.32
The 1990 case of Mackenzie v. Breakstone is a good example.33 In
Mackenzie, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a contribution to ajudge
or to the judge's spouse by a litigant or the litigant's counsel, in and of
itself, was not sufficient grounds to sustain a motion to disqualify the
judge.34 While some members of the court expressed discomfort with the
ruling, they stated that it was the only one that would not thrust the system
into disarray. The court worried that too many attorneys would be barred
from practicing in the courts of their jurisdiction due to campaign
contributions and that other contributors, such as special interest groups,
would then replace lawyers as the primary contributors ofjudicial election
campaigns. 35 Hence, short of adopting public financing for judicial
elections, little change may be possible to cure the potential for problems
related to lawyers' funding of judicial campaigns.
Another criticism of judicial elections is that voters have little or no
knowledge about the candidates, and thus, they are unable to adequately
assess his or her judicial capabilities, specifically those related to judicial
temperament, legal ability, and other qualities specific to the bench.
Moreover, the attributes required of a good politician in a contested
election may be very different from those required of an impartial judge.
Critics point out that name recognition, ballot placement, and political
affiliation are often the only information voters have to decide between
various judicial elective candidates. Indeed, the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibits judicial candidates from making
statements
36
concerning how he or she might rule on a future matter.
B. Merit Selection and Retention orAppointive Plans
The merit selection and retention process described earlier uses judicial
nominating commissions to screen and evaluate potential candidates.
Supporters believe this process results in a higher quality of candidates by
encouraging a broader and more diverse group to offer themselves for
judicial office. They also point out that members of judicial nominating
commissions are better qualified to investigate and evaluate the candidates
31. See id.
32. See Susan E. Liontas, Note, JudicialElections Have No Winners, 20 STET. L. REV. 309,
311-14 (1990).
33. See 565 So. 2d 1332, 1337-38 (Fla. 1990).
34.. See id.
35. See id. at 1341 (Kogan, J., concurring).
36. See supra note 13.
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than the average voters.
Merit selection and retention is criticized as a "closed-door" system.
Judicial nominating commissions are viewed by some as an "elitist" group
that "allows a small handful of lawyers to decide for a community who
shall be our judges".37 In a critique similar to that leveled at the elective
process, proponents argue that merit selection and retention elections are
an effective way to remove unqualified judges from the bench. In Florida,
there has never been a district court of appeal judge or a justice of the
Supreme Court removed by means of a retention election.
Merit selection and retention, however, are viewed as a better way to
facilitate the addition of minorities and women to the bench. Yet, minority
organizations have often opposed the creation of such systems.38 Women
and minority groups sometimes accuse merit selection and retention of
actually reducing their chances of gaining judgeships.39 Attempts at
empirical studies have done little to clear up the quandary because of
various factors influencing the reports in different jurisdictions.'
Nonetheless, one recent report by the American Judicature Society did find
that merit selection and retention was responsible for more minorities and
women rising to the bench than any other selection method. 41 A 1990 study
by the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission
also found that such methods have been responsible for a majority of the
judgeships obtained by minorities.42
VI. A HISTORY OF JuDIcIAL SELECTION IN FLORIDA
Florida uses both the appointive and elective methods. Since 1976,
justices of the Supreme Court and district courts of appeal judges have
been selected by a merit selection and retention process. 43 Currently,
circuit court and county court judges are chosen in local nonpartisan
elections.44

37. A.J. Barranco, Don't Eliminate the Right to Elect Florida'sTrial Judges, FLA. BAR
NEWS, Aug. 15, 1999, at 4.

38. See Garcia, supra note 21, at 15.
39. See id.

40. See id.
41. See id. at 16.

42. "Although a vast majority of minority judges serve on the trial courts where election is
the general manner of selection, most of these minority judges were originally appointed to the
bench to fill unexpired terms. Of the minority judges serving on the circuit and county courts, 88%
of the African-American judges and 80% of the Hispanic judges were originally appointed to the
bench." Report and Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racialand Ethnic Study
Commission, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591, 615 (1992). But see Barranco, supra note 37.
43. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10-11.

44. See id. art V, § 10 (b). The first Florida Constitution called for all judges to be appointed
by the general assembly. See Joseph W. Little, An Overview of the HistoricalDevelopment of the
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Since 1971, Florida governors have used a judicial nominating
commission system to assist in the appointment of all judges. Like most
states, Florida fills many of its judicial vacancies, including the elected
trial court vacancies, by temporary gubernatorial appointments.45 This
temporary gubernatorial appointment process is essentially one of merit
selection and retention. 6 The result is that a large percentage of Florida's
judges, including circuit court and county court judges, are initially
selected through a merit selection system.47 These trial court judges must
then face a contested election (assuming someone chooses to run against
them).
In Florida, judicial nominating commissions are composed of nine
members; three lawyer members chosen by the governor, three lawyer
members chosen by The Florida Bar, and three public members selected
by the other six commissioners. Beginning in 1991, they were required by
statute to include at least three individuals from "a racial or ethnic
minority group or a woman." 48 Each of the three groups was required to
have at least one woman or ethnic minority. In 1995, the provision was
enjoined in a court challenge until a federal court decides the
constitutionality ofthe statute. 49 Despite the controversy, there is statistical
evidence that more African-Americans and women have been appointed
to the bench in Florida through merit selection and retention than through
contested elections 50

JudicialArticle of the FloridaConstitution, 19 STET. L. REv. 1, 3 (1989). In 1852, the Florida

Constitution was amended to require the election of Circuit Court judges. After the Civil War, the
Florida Constitution was amended a second time. See id. at 6. For the next ninety years, the

Governor appointed judges with approval from the Florida Senate. See id. at 7. In 1942, the Florida
Constitution was amended again, replacing gubernatorial appointment with general elections with
respect to trial judges. See id. at 23. From 1885 until 1976, Florida Supreme Court justices were
elected to the bench. See id. In 1976, Florida voters amended the Florida Constitution and approved
the use of Merit Selection and Retention elections for Supreme and Appellate Court judges. See id.
at 35.
45. See Leander Shaw, Jr., Florida'sJudicialMerit Selection and Retention System: The

BetterAlternative,20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 283,284 (1992).
46. See id.
47. See id.

48. Racial or ethnic minority members were defined as "members of a socially or
economically disadvantaged group which includes Blacks, Hispanics and American Indians." FLA.
STAT. § 43.29 (1991).
49. See Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
50. See Madison B. McClellan, MeritAppointment Versus PopularElection:A Reformer's
Guide to JudicialSelection Methods in Florida,43 FLA. L. REv. 529, 550 (1986).
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VII. THE FLORIDA BAR AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
For the last thirty years, with the exception of a 1984 Board of
Governors decision, The Florida Bar has consistently supported
constitutional proposals to adopt merit selection and retention for all
judges in Florida." In 1990, its Board of Governors endorsed the Missouri
Plan with an "opt-out" option for local jurisdictions. 2 The "opt-out" plan
would have allowed individual counties to choose whether or not to
implement merit selection and retention. In 1996, the Board of Governors
renewed its support for merit selection and retention, but this time
endorsed an "opt-in" plan. 3 At its February 2000 meeting, the Board of
Governors voted to recommend that Florida voters adopt merit selection
and retention in all circuits. 54
VIII. THE 1997-98 FLORIDA CONSTrrUTION
REVISION COMMISSION

Florida is the only state that requires a periodic review of its
Constitution by an appointed citizens group that has direct access to the
ballot. In 1968, in a comprehensive rewrite of the Constitution, Florida
enacted something "new under the sun": an "appointed, unlimited,
automatic Constitution Revision Commission... [with] direct access to
the ballot."55 Other states sometimes hold elections to decide whether or
not they should have a constitution revision commission, but Florida is the
only state with an automatic provision reviving the CRC every twenty
years.56
The first Constitution Revision Commission was convened in 1978. 57
This Commission proposed several comprehensive revisions. One of them
would have extended merit selection and retention to county and circuit
court judges. Florida voters rejected that proposal, along with all of the
other revisions proposed by that Commission. 8
Twenty years later, the Constitution Revision Commission was again

51. See Merit Selection andRetention, Florida Bar-Related Issues Background Papers, Feb.
2000. <http://199.44.15.3/PIPS799.nsf/ 119bd38ae090a748525676f0053b606/db7173e85a333f
978525669e004d01f3?OpenDocument>.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See Gary Blankership, BoardBacks Merit Selection, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 15, 2000.
<http:llwww.flabar.orglnewflabar/publicmediainfo/tfbnews/OOfebl5-1.htnl>.
55. Robert F. Williams, The Florida Constitution Revision Commission in Historicaland
National Context, 50 FLA. L. REv. 215,220 (1998).
56. See id. at 221.
57. See id. at 222.
58. Revision #6 drew 1,058,574 "Yes" votes and 1,095,736 "No" votes. See Merit Selection
and Retention, Florida Bar-Related Issues Background Papers, supra note 51.
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convened. This time the CRC recommended what became known as
"Revision Seven," because of its placement on the ballot, and was titled
"Local Option for Selection of Judges and Funding of State Courts."
Revision Seven was a multi-faceted court-related measure. One of the key
provisions provided for merit selection and retention. 9 In 1998, Florida
voters approved Revision Seven. Article V, Section 10(b) "preserves" the
election of circuit and county court judges, but gives each jurisdiction the
option to use merit selection and retention. It is an "opt-in" provision. The
initial "opt-in" vote will be at the general election in November of 2000.'
The 1997-98 CRC relied heavily on work that was done in the twenty
years between its meetings. One important example was the work of the
Article V Task Force, a statutorily created entity charged with reviewing
the judiciary article of the Florida Constitution and suggesting changes to
facilitate the administration of justice.6 1 The Final Report of the Article V
Task Force contained a recommendation to establish a merit selection and
retention process for "all county court and all circuit court judges. ' 62 This
recommendation was founded in part on the belief that "[a] move to merit
selection and retention will maximize participation by women and
minorities on the trial bench."' 3 Statistics since that time seem to support

59. See Williams, supra note 55.
60. Article V, section 10(b), Florida Constitution provides:
(1)

(2)

(3)

The election of circuit judges shall be preserved notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (a) unless a majority of those voting in the
jurisdiction of that circuit approves a local option to select circuit judges
by merit selection and retention rather than by election. The election of
judges shall be by a vote of the qualified electors within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
The election of county court judges shall be preserved notwithstanding
the provisions of subsection (a) unless a majority of those voting in the
jurisdiction of that county approves a local option to select county judges
by merit selection and retention rather than by election. The election of
county court judges shall be by a vote of the qualified electors within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
a.
A vote to exercise a local option to select circuit court judges and
county court judges by merit selection and retention rather than by
election shall be held in each circuit and county at the general
election in the year 2000. If a vote to exercise this local option fails
in a vote of the electors, such option shall not again be put to a vote
of the electors ofthat jurisdiction until the expiration of at least two
years.

FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).

61. See LAWS OFFLORIDA, ch. 94-138 (1994).
62. Article V Task Force, FinalReport, Issue #1, at 4 (Dec. 1995).
63. Id.
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that assumption.
Other empirical data suggest that merit selection and retention does
result in more qualified judges. Since 1970, the Judicial Qualifications
Commission (the commission charged with investigating and disciplining
state court judges)' has disciplined sixty-nine judges.65 Seventy percent
of the reprimanded judges first came to the bench by election rather than
by appointment.' Eighty-three percent of the judges who were removed
from the bench, or who resigned with charges pending against them, were
elected to those positions.67
IX. CONCLUSION

Time will tell whether these facts and related arguments will be
persuasive to the voters. Judicial selection is-and always has been-a hot
topic. The method of choosing ourjudges may have generated more debate
and literature than any other topic in the administration of justice. At its
heart, the process must be one that provides the American people with
judges who are qualified and impartial. The process must have the
confidence of the people and be true to the rule of law that is essential to
our democracy. This requires a careful balance of independence and
accountability to ensure that ourjudges can rule without fear or favor. This
is especially true for trial judges, who are most often in direct contact with
the citizenry. Like the Florida Bar, the American Bar Association endorses
merit selection and retention. 6' As a member of the Commission, I
supported merit selection and retention for many of the reasons detailed in
this article. Although no system of selecting judges, just as no system of
government, is perfect, merit selection and retention, to me, is the one that
comes closest to avoiding conflicts and to securing judges who are
independent, accountable, and impartial.

64. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a).
65. See MeritSelection andRetention, Florida Bar-Related Issues Background Papers, supra
note 51.
66. See Martha W. Barnett, Merit Retentionfor TrialJudges: It's an Idea that Works, FLA.
BAR NEWS, Jan. 15, 2000, at 7.
67. See id.
68. See REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE (Aug. 1997); see also Garcia,supra note 21.
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